The Despotic Fragment:

a critique of the traditional account of the relationship between the different internal principles of action and the various parts of the soul

Julian Urrutiaa

It is the conceptions of ourselves that are most important to us that give rise to unconditional
obligations. For, to violate them is to lose your integrity and so your identity, and to no longer be

who you are. That is, it is to no longer be able to think of yourself under the description under
which you value yourself and find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth
undertaking. It is to be for all practical purposes dead or worse than dead.
							

-Christine Korsgaard 1

The path to self-discovery is one which today’s youth are very concerned to travel. The

tropical paradises of the world are populated by beach-bums who ‘found themselves’ on
their sandy shores. But my grandfather, and many of his generation, never quite understood
how it could be possible that one should discover, or ‘find’, oneself (or rather, how it could

be possible that one should not do so). And it must be conceded that the manner in which
the topic is usually discussed begs the question. My grandfather never accepted the notion,
which now has become common knowledge, that one needs to actively discover one’s ‘self’.
How could one possibly loose one’s ‘self’ such that one should have to find it? How could

one have reached the age of reason without a clear idea of who one is?
My grandfather was born before the psychological revolution that began with
Freud’s theory of the subconscious, which might explain why he never empathized with
these concerns. However, the idea that we have repressed desires, impulses and inclinations,

whose existence we ignore, and that influence how we act and make decisions, certainly
legitimizes much of the prevalent preoccupation over the character of our agential
identities. Unfortunately, exploring Freud’s neatly dichotomized mind might prove more
disconcerting than one might hope. We often do not identify with that urge we discovered,
1.
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or with that desire we didn’t know we had—they seem external to us; we do not feel they
are expressive of who we really are. So we might come to the conclusion that the process of

finding who we are necessarily involves a process of deciding who we are not—for through
our introspection we might discover more than our self. The problem thus becomes one not
only of self-discovery, but also of self-formation. We are faced with the problem of having to
decide which of the many internal principles of action that motivate our behavior are part

of what we are as agents, and which are not—and this is no small problem.
But the problem is more than just an academic one. It is not just a matter of
wanting to understand ourselves because it a meaningful goal in itself—it is also a matter of
much more profound significance. Too many important aspects of our lives—ranging from
our professional reputation, and our position in our networks of friends and family, to our
religious and cultural affiliations—are irrevocably and unequivocally linked to our agential

identities. In The Sources of Normativity (1996), Korsgaard gives us an analytical account of
the enormous implications that our practical identities carry with them. She argues that our

practical identities are the source of our normative commitments.
The conception of one’s identity in question here is not a theoretical one, a view about
what as a matter of inescapable scientific fact you are. It is better understood as a description
under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth

living and your actions to be worth undertaking. You are a human being, a woman or
a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group; someone’s lover
or friend, and so on. And all of these identities give rise to reasons and obligations. Your
reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity

forbids.
As such, my grandfather’s position regarding the process of self-identification does not

seem like it should be counseled. Instead, it would perhaps be advisable that one should
take pains to form a self with which one is comfortable and satisfied, since our normative

commitments are inseparable from our practical identity as an agent. So the question
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becomes about how it is that we navigate this self-formation that results in an identity
which is, according to Korsgaard, “the source of normativity.”2
Harry Frankfurt believes that our capacity for introspection, by which we are able
to confront and evaluate our motives and desires—which is what gives rise to the problem
in the first place—also provides the solution. The reflexive structure of our mind, by virtue
of which we are self-conscious, not only forces us to confront and evaluate those principles
by which we are moved to action; it further allows us to be active with respect to those very
principles. In so far as we are the kinds of beings who can reflect on our appetites, passions,
reasons and desires—we are also the kinds of beings who can decide which of those motives
truly constitute what we are; we can decide whether any particular disposition in question

is a characteristic with which we identify, and thus actively incorporate into ourselves, or
whether we reject it and exclude it from our agential identity. Frankfurt would therefore
have us believe that it is through a conscious exercise of our will that we come to create
our agential identity. Korsgaard seems to share a very similar view. There is a strong affinity
between her strategy, which involves a process of ‘reflective endorsement’ of our motives,

and Frankfurt’s treatment of the question at hand.
I do not believe Frankfurt and Korsgaard’s theory of identification is correct. Their
error is consistent with a long-standing but misguided view of the structure of the human
soul. It results from assuming a fallacious relationship of authority between our conscious,

deliberative faculties and the other internal principles of action. I reject the notion that
reflection stands in a privileged position of prerogative over the other internal principles
of action as the most legitimate source of our agency. I maintain that the philosopher’s
habit of deferring to conscious deliberation before and above any other of our internal
springs is unfounded. There is a mounting body of empirical evidence that suggests that
no amount of reflexivity has the capacity to unify our agency such that we can create ‘self’
through reflexive self-evaluation in the way Harry Frankfurt envisions. Rather, I believe the
evidence suggests that any self-conception at which we arrive through reflection will fail to
2.
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be representative of the entire quality of our agency, and further, it might estrange us from
aspects of our agency which we might fully endorse in different contexts or under different

circumstances.
I will first review the significance and the fundamental characteristics of Frankfurt’s

theory of identification, including Michael Bratman’s expansion on it, in order to obtain
a picture of the kind of agents they would have us believe we are. Then, in an effort to
produce a comprehensive argument, I will begin my own exposition with a systematic
account of what it means to be one kind of agent as opposed to another—of what I believe
are the correct criteria by which we arrive at these distinctions. From there, I will proceed to
review a body of empirical evidence which suggests a picture of human agency that discords
with Frankfurt and Korsgaard’s perspective. This will lead us to my view of the structure of
our cognitive architecture, which will allow us to make sense of that odd body of empirical

evidence regarding the actual character of our agency.
Identification, Freedom and Normative Agency
Appetites, passions, affections, and the principle of reflection, considered merely as the
several parts of our inward nature, do not at all give us an idea of the system or constitution of this
nature, because the constitution is formed by somewhat not yet taken into consideration, namely,
by the relations which these several parts have to each other; the chief of which is the authority of

reflection or conscience.
							

-Bishop Joseph Butler3

In his sermons, Bishop Butler articulates a view of human nature that can be traced
at least back to Aristotle, and that has been—and still is—the most prevalent view of our
motivational structure. I will call it ‘the traditional view’ and it is the view which I intend

to challenge. This view of the ‘soul’, if you will, is biased in favor of one of our internal
principles of action, viz. the ‘principle of reflection’, which is given a prerogative over all the
3.
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others as if the legitimacy of its authority was completely obvious. Although Frankfurt’s and
Korsgaard’s views are, in my opinion, more aligned with the facts than the traditional view,
they nonetheless beg the question by granting our capacity for reflexive self-evaluation an

unwarrantedly privileged position. And the problem with this assumption regarding the
status of our capacity for self-evaluation is that it allows us to arrive at fallacious solutions to
several important problems, such as those regarding the freedom of our wills or the sources

of normativity. Thus, a challenge to the traditional view amounts to a challenge to the
solutions for those problems that follow from it.
Freedom of the Will and Frankfurt’s View
Let’s begin with Frankfurt’s take on the subject. He begins with the reality that people

in general care about what kind of persons they are. And the truth of the matter is that
we do, generally, care very deeply about what moves us to action—about what motives,
desires, inclinations, or reasons (etc.) underlie our behavior. To use Frankfurt’s language, “It
matters greatly to us whether the desires by which we are moved to act as we do motivate
us because we want them to be effective in moving us or whether they move us regardless

of ourselves or even despite ourselves.”4 According to Frankfurt, it is as if we were not in
control of our own behavior—as if our actions were being determined by something that
is not a part of ourselves such that we become passive observers of our own behavior. Thus,

he argues that the problem of who we are can also be construed as problem of free will.
Frankfurt reminds us that “according to one familiar philosophical tradition, being free
is fundamentally a matter of doing what one wants to do.”5 But under this account, it is
impossible to distinguish between an agent who acts freely, and one whose will is free. As
such, it is important to draw a distinction between a free action and free will. Frankfurt
4.
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defines the will as that desire which effectively moves a person to action.
He therefore states:
Freedom of action is (roughly) the freedom to do what one wants to do. Analogously,
then…freedom of the will means (also roughly) that [the agent] is free to want what
he wants to want. More precisely, it means that he is free to will what he wants to
will, or to have the will he wants. Just as the question about the freedom of an agent’s
action has to do with whether it is the action he wants to perform, so the question
about the freedom of his will has to do with whether it is the will he wants to have.6

As such, the free will problem is not one that all agents have to face. Only those who

can have desires regarding their desires—those who can have second-order desires—face
this problem. Only those agents who can, as it were, reflect on their desire to act this way
or that, and evaluate them from a distance, face the problem of finding that they are moved
to act by forces that they do not endorse. In other words, from Frankfurt’s perspective, the
problem of free will presupposes an identity with which some desires can conflict. And as
we shall see, so does the problem of normativity. Thus, it becomes apparent that the path to
self-discovery takes us far beyond the beaches of Tahiti into the very depths of what it means
to be, qua agents, human. It takes us down to those fundamental qualities that distinguish

us from any other type of agents.
Frankfurt’s Theory of Identification
It is these acts of ordering and of rejection—integration and separation—that create a self

out of the raw materials of inner life. They define the intrapsychic constraints and boundaries
with respect to which a person’s autonomy may be threatened even by his own desires.
							
6.
7.
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In “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” (1971), Frankfurt claims that,
Many animals appear to have the capacity for…‘first-order desires’, which are simply
desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however,
appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the
formation of second-order desires.8

In his terminology, a second-order desire is an intentional state about a first-order
desire; it is, for instance, a desire to have a desire. Under Frankfurt’s account, the relevant

kind of identification requires more than just second-order desires—it is not enough to
simply want to have a certain desire; we must want a certain desire to be our will. He calls

these kinds of second-order desires ‘second-order volitions’. It is not enough for an agent
who cares about her will to want to have certain desires;, she needs to want that those desires

to be effective. Frankfurt argues that we identify with a desire by endorsing it through a
second-order volition that it be our will. This second-order volition can be understood
as a commitment to include that desire as one of the internal principles of action that
characterizes our agency. Unfortunately, the matter is not so simple; we are motivationally

more complex that this sketchy picture of our soul suggests. Just as we are many times
conflicted or ambivalent regarding our first-order desires, we can be similarly ambivalent
regarding our second-order desires. Just as we are not always sure about which desires we
should act on, we are not always sure about which desires we would like to have—we are
not always sure about which of our desires we endorse, which ones we tolerate, and which

ones we reject.
So what happens in the case of conflicting second-order desires? Must we now
move to a higher level and adopt a volition of the third order regarding our second-order
desires? And what if there is similar tension at this level? How can we avoid the threat of
infinite regress without just cutting it off arbitrarily? In the 1971 essay, Frankfurt tries to
deal with this concern by stating that a person can identify herself ‘decisively’ with one of
8.

Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.”

Spring 2010 | SPICE | Philosophy, Politics & Economics Undergraduate Journal

13

her first-order desires such that her commitment to it ‘resounds’ throughout, and hence
terminates, the potential regress. But as Gary Watson points out,
We wanted to know what prevents wantonness with regard to one’s higher order volitions.
What gives these volitions any special relation to ‘oneself’? It is unhelpful to answer that
one makes a ‘decisive commitment’, where this just means that an interminable ascent to
higher orders is not going to be permitted. This is arbitrary.9

Thus, in “Identification and Wholeheartedness” (1988), Frankfurt gives a more
complete account of how this problem can be dealt with by appealing to an example of an

individual engaged in an arithmetic calculation. Having arrived at an answer, this person
verifies it with a second calculation, but it is possible that both calculations are faulty. This

person faces a similar series of calculations that might extend ad infinitum. One way to
resolve the situation is to simply quit and allow the result of the last calculation to serve as
the answer. In this case the agent is passive with regard to the resolution of the conflict; in

fact, the conflict has not really been resolved but merely abandoned or ignored. A more
conclusive way to solve the situation is to make an active decision to adopt that solution as
the answer. This is possible if, for example, the agent is fully confident that she has arrived at
the correct answer. In this case, the future is clear to her and her decision to adopt this result

as the answer resounds throughout the threatening regress because her confidence allows
her to “anticipate the outcome of an indefinite number of possible future calculations.”10
But even in the case where she is not fully confident about her results, she will be capable of
deciding in favor of her answer, without being arbitrary, if she feels she has reason to believe
that any future results will not conflict with those at which she has already arrived. In other
words, absent complete confidence in the correctness of her results, if the agent nonetheless

does not find a disturbing conflict between those results, and between those results and
any results at which she might reasonably expect to arrive given further calculations—she
9.
10.
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is left without a reason to engage in any such further calculations. Thus, her decision to
commit to her answer is not arbitrary by any means. Similarly, a person reflecting on her
desires—either because they conflict with each other or because a general lack of confidence

casts doubt on her satisfaction with them—can avoid the regress by making a decisive
commitment to endorse one of them. If she finds there is no conflict between the results
already obtained by her evaluation, or between these results and any she might reasonably
expect to obtain through further evaluations, the agent is left without a reason to continue
evaluating her desires and can decide to endorse one or the other. Terminating the evaluative

regress at this point can hardly be deemed arbitrary. And through this decision to cut off
the process of forming desires of increasingly higher orders, our agent determines what she

really wants because it allows her to separate the desires she endorses from those she does
not—the decision makes that desire which she has chosen to endorse fully her own, it
makes her identify with that desire.
Frankfurt and Korsgaard’s Agent
A lower animal’s attention is fixed on the world. Its perceptions are its beliefs and its desires
are its will. It is engaged in conscious activities, but it is not conscious of them. That is, they are
not the objects of its attention. But we human animals turn our attention on to our perceptions
and desires themselves, on to our own mental activities and we are conscious of them. That is why

we can think about them. And this sets us a problem no other animal has. It is the problem of
the normative.
							

-Korsgaard11

In “Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason” (1999), Michael Bratman fills

in the possible gaps Frankfurt leaves by giving a systematic account of what it means to
make a decision by which we identify with our desires. Bratman argues that we come to
identify with a desire when we decide to treat it as reason-giving. It involves a decision
11.
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about whether or not to count a desire as a reason in our deliberation. Thus, the decision
by which we identify with a desire involves deciding to treat the desire as reason-giving, and
being satisfied with that decision in the sense of it not being in conflict with other standing

decisions about which desires to treat as reason giving.12 In doing so, we endorse that desire
and make it part of who we are. A full description of ourselves would have to include a
commitment to pursue the satisfaction of that desire, since we have decided to treat it as
reason-giving.
According to Bratman, ‘reasons’ give us ends that we feel we are justified in pursuing;

‘reasons’ justify the relevant means we take towards an end.13 But they play more than
simply a justificatory role; as Korsgaard points out, the word ‘reason’ is a normative word.

As such, we are more than simply justified in pursuing an end which we believe we have
reason to pursue—we are committed to its pursuit. Reasons commit us in the sense that not
behaving in the way we have reason to behave would make our actions unintelligible both
to ourselves and to third parties. A chess master playing to win a tournament has a reason

to make a certain move if he realizes it will put his opponent in checkmate. That fact not
only justifies his making the move—it makes it so that any other move would be impossible

to explain; it would be incoherent and unintelligible. Thus, through the same process by
which we come to identify with our desires, we find that we become obligated to them. So
by the same process through which we create a practical identify for ourselves, we come to

create commitments for ourselves—we come to obligate ourselves.
Thus, the same faculty which according to Frankfurt makes us into the kinds of agents

who can have a free will, for whom freedom of the will can be a problem by virtue of being
able to make our desires the objects of our attention, also makes us into the kinds of agents
who impose duties and obligations on ourselves. The process of identifying with our desires

through reflexive self-evaluation also makes us commit to the satisfaction of those desires
because, as Korsgaard puts it, our “identities give rise to reasons and obligations. [Our]
12.
Bratman, M. “Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason.” In: Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on
Intention and Agency, by Michael Bratman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
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reasons express [our] identity, [our] nature; [our] obligations spring from what that identity

forbids.”14 Therefore, our capacity for reflexive self-evaluation makes “obligation in general
a reality of human life.”15
The argument is certainly compelling. As Frankfurt himself points out, his account
of identification allows for a theory concerning freedom of the will that meets all the
essential conditions which such a theory should meet: it accounts for our disinclination to

adjudicate this freedom to any other species than our own, and it makes it apparent why
this kind of freedom is desirable. According to Frankfurt, a person who is free to do what
he wants to do, and to want what he wants to want, enjoys “all the freedom it is possible to

desire or to conceive.”16 It also allows Korsgaard to ground the elusive source of normativity
in a way that is consistent with that freedom. It allows her to provide a view of human
agency that is simultaneously autonomous and normatively constrained. In other words,
Frankfurt and Korsgaard’s appeal to our self-consciousness allows them to simultaneously
establish the source of the characteristics which we believe are epitomic of human agency:

freedom, autonomy, and morality.
Unfortunately, if our capacity for reflexive self-evaluation really is the source of our
freedom, our autonomy, and our morality, it is not at all clear to me that we really are free,
autonomous and moral agents—nor that we would want to so be. I am of the opinion
that we are much less self-conscious than we would like to be, and that any identity we
might create through a process of reflexive endorsement will necessarily leave out aspects of
our agency that will eventually be effective in governing our behavior, and that we would

endorse if we could. However, I do not believe the problem is simply one of epistemic
limitations. My claim is much stronger than that: my claim is that even if we did have
conscious access to all the aspects of our agency, a process of reflexive endorsement would
necessarily estrange aspects of our agency that will, again, eventually govern our behavior,
and that we would fully endorse given the appropriate circumstances or context. As such,
14.
15.
16.
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not only will we not be free much of the time, nor will we be autonomous or moral—we
will not want to be any of these things because that identity which would be the source of
our freedom, autonomy, and morality will always be more a product of circumstance than

of our volition, and it will therefore necessarily estrange aspects of agency which, mutatis
mutandis, we would fully endorse as being a part of ourselves, and which we would desire
that they be effective in governing our behavior given the appropriate circumstances or the

appropriate context.
To establish my claim, I will rely mostly on empirical evidence that shows how
remarkably ineffective, inconsistent, and self-deluded our conscious agency really is. I will

use this evidence to show that we are not the kind of agents Frankfurt and Korsgaard would
have us believe we are. I will then give an account of my view of the structure of our
cognitive architecture, which I will use to argue why we cannot be that kind of agents. Why
we would not want to be those kinds of agents will be self-evident given that my view of
the structure of our cognitive architecture is indeed accurate. However, it is worthwhile to
indulge in a quick digression about the criterion by which we distinguish between different
kinds of agents so as to avoid any potential misunderstandings about what I mean when I

talk about ‘different kind of agents or agencies.’
Human Agency
The Constraint-Conforming Approach to Agency
To be an intentional system, and therefore to qualify as ‘minded’ in some minimal sense, is,
on standard approaches, to be a system that is well-behaved in representational related respects.
The well-behaved system represents things as they appear within the constraints of its perceptual

and cognitive organization. And it acts in ways that further its desires…in the light of those
representations or beliefs. An intentional system may not be perfectly behaved in these action-
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related and evidence-related ways, but it will have to attain a certain threshold of rational
performance—and perhaps do so as a result of a certain history or organization—if it is to seem

like it is minded at all.
						

-Victoria McGeer and Philip Pettit17

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, an agent is one who performs

activity that is directed at a goal. Thus, agency can be understood as the capacity for goaldirected activity. This definition is perhaps too broad if one intends to address human
agency, but I want to start with the most general understanding of what constitutes agency

and build my way up to a precise understanding of what constitutes human agency—
what distinguishes human beings from other agents. However, I am willing to make one
pre-analytical claim about human agency that I don’t believe will be disagreeable: human
beings are very sophisticated agents. Compared to a cow, a pigeon, or even Deep Blue (the
computer that beat Kasparov at chess), human beings are much more complex, refined and
multifarious agents. But it is important to distinguish between the faculties that support a
certain kind of agency, the capacity to exercise that agency, and the actual character of the

agency that is exercised.
As I mentioned very briefly in the introduction, I believe that the mind, which I
will argue is embodied in our cognitive faculties, is the very source of our agency. A good
understanding of the structure and the functioning of our mind is therefore requisite in any
discussion about agency. I began this section with a quote from McGeer and Pettit’s “The

Self Regulating Mind,” where they articulate what they call ‘the constraint-conforming
approach to the mind,’ which I have borrowed to suit my purposes. We ordinarily think
of the difference between human beings and other animals in positive terms. We think of
the things that we humans can do that other agents cannot—we think of the difference in
terms of being differently able. Another way of approaching the subject would be to think
of the difference in negative terms—in terms of being differently constrained. I think both
17.
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approaches are ultimately equivalent, but it will suit my purposes better to use the latter
approach. I will argue that we should distinguish between different kinds of agents on the

basis of the constraints that limit the manner and the extent to which they exercise their
agency.
It is almost trivial to state that there are constraints to agency. An agent locked in
a small room has her capacity for activity effectively constrained. She might be similarly
constrained by non-physical forces, like strong social pressures or her family’s expectations.
However, most constraints are not exogenous to the agent in this way. Agency can also be
constrained by physical, perceptual, epistemic, and motivational limitations (to name only
a few) that are themselves endogenous to the agent. As McGeer and Pettit point out in the

quote above, some of the most significant constraints on our agency are representational.
The more accurately and extensively an agent can represent his environment, the more
nuanced, precise, and sophisticated his agency. Of course, different agents face different
constraints, and similar constraints might limit different agents to varying degrees. In other
words, the constraints that limit the extent to which agency can be exerted vary in degree

as well as in kind. A very myopic individual faces a constraint to her agency which, ceteris
paribus, someone who is only moderately afflicted by the same condition does not face;
the difference between the constraints these individuals face is one of degree. In contrast,
an arachnophobe faces a constraint which, ceteris paribus, a dendrophobe does not; these
constraints are different in kind. Though it is perhaps an obvious distinction, I believe it has

profound implications on our discussion.
The very myopic individual is less able to discriminate and attend to the relevant stimuli

in her environment; she is less sensitive to the relevant stimuli than the other individual. As
such, the scope of her agency is more limited because she is less able to respond precisely to
the relevant constraints. On the other hand, the arachnophobe might be just as sensitive to
spiders as the dendrophobe is to trees; they are simply sensitive to different kinds of stimuli
as constraints. As such, given the right proportions of spiders and trees, the scope of their

20
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agency could be equally limited, but each identifies very different limiting constraints; they
each find very different stimuli to be relevant. This is significant because, far and wide, our
phobics will face different constraints in any given circumstance; the degree to which they
are limited will depend on considerations of how and when. There is nothing we can know

about the extent to which they will be limited without specifications about the particular
situation or context. The case of our myopes is different; we know that one will be more
limited than the other under any set of conditions. This is significant in that it allows us to
distinguish between different types of agents. Agents that face similar kinds of constraints

might be said to be the same type of agents, even if they can be further differentiated by
the degree to which those constraints limit the extent to which they can engage in goaldirected activity. Human agency is such that we face many kinds of constraints, and are very
sensitive to individual instances of each kind of stimuli. We are the type of agents who are

most sensitive to the biggest range of constraints.
But perhaps the question of how to distinguish between different types of agents is
not so simple. It is also true that agents will differ in how they stand in relation to the same
constraints. For example, an agent might be capable of exerting its agency adaptively given
the constraints that it faces, without being aware of the constraints themselves. In contrast,
an agent might be explicitly aware of the limits to its agency, of what constraints it faces, and
as a result be capable of responding to them deliberately. An agent that is explicitly aware

of the constraints it faces might not only be able to exercise its agency more deliberately
with relation to those constraints, it might further be able to exercise its agency in a way
that deliberately alters those constraints; it might be able to affect the limits to its own
agency.18 One could imagine agents that face the same constraints but differ in how they
stand in relation to them in this way. Human beings are the kinds of agents that can affect

the constraints that affect their own agency.
I believe the first approach is most correct, but perhaps someone might object on the

grounds that this method for distinguishing types of agents is not sufficiently refined to
18
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allow for distinctions of more than academic relevance. The critic might argue that agents

might face all the same constraints, and yet differ in how they stand in relation to those
constraints. If the only criteria by which we distinguish agents are the kinds of constraints

they face, then there is an important sense in which we might not be able to distinguish
between Gary Kasparov and IBM’s Deep Blue. But there is a very significant difference
between the two Chess World Champions, and this difference lies exactly in how they
stand in relation to the constraints they face. An agent who can attend to the constraints
that it faces can act deliberately in response to the constraints themselves, while an agent
who cannot attend to those constraints, who is unaware of what those constraints are, can

only act as a response to them. An agent who can attend to its constraints can direct its
actions at the constraints themselves—it can deliberately direct its actions at the constraints
themselves. An agent who is unaware of what constraints it faces—one who cannot identify

those constraints as constraints, cannot deliberately make those constraints the object of
its intentional action. It cannot intentionally alter what constraints it faces. Thus an agent

that can intentionally alter its constraints, such as Kasparov, can potentially change both
the degree to which the constraints limit the scope of its agency, as well as the kind of
constraints it faces. Deep Blue, on the other hand, does not have this option; it will always
act in response to the chess-playing algorithms that constitute the source of its agency, and

having that option is an important difference in the kinds of agency which Kasparov and
Deep Blue can exercise.
But this admittedly intuitive argument is fallacious. Let’s go back to our myopes and
our phobics: by identifying that the quality of her vision limits the scope of her agency, our
myope can choose to buy glasses with the intention of changing the degree to which she is
constrained my her myopia. Similarly, our dendrophobe can choose to begin some kind of

therapy to eliminate his irrational fear of trees. But notice that their capacity to attend to
the constraints by itself does not necessarily change the kind of agents these persons are. It

perhaps changes the kind of agent the person can be, but the capacity itself doesn’t change

22

Spring 2010 | SPICE | Philosophy, Politics & Economics Undergraduate Journal

the kind of constraints she faces; it does not change whether any particular kind of stimuli

actually constrain her agency. If the myope doesn’t buy glasses, and the dendrophobe
doesn’t go to a shrink, they will continue to be the kind of agents that are respectively
nearsighted or fearful of trees. Similarly, though Kasparov can choose not to be limited
by the same constraints the limit Deep Blue’s agency, if he doesn’t choose to exercise that
capacity but instead chooses to spend the rest of his life playing chess against Deep Blue, he

will effectively be no different from the computer.
So it is not the case, as the critic believed, that agents should be classified according to
how they stand in relation to their constraints. Instead, it is more in line with our current
intuitions to classify them according to the kinds of constraints which effectively limit their
agency. Our capacity to attend to our constraints—including our motivational, passional,

appetitive, or otherwise intentional constraints—allows us to distinguish ourselves in a
theoretical sense, but it is not sufficient to distinguish us in the relevant, practical sense. So

what Frankfurt and Korsgaard have articulated really refers to the kinds of agents human
beings can be—not to the kind of agents that we are. Though they are both correct when
they assert that our capacity for reflexive self-evaluation presents us with the problems of
freedom of the will, autonomy, and normativity—it is not at all clear that it is also true that

this capacity allows us to resolve the problem.
Part of the appeal of Frankfurt, and Korsgaard’s account is that it seems to encompass

the most fundamental and epitomic aspects of human agency: freedom, autonomy and
normartivity. It is by virtue of our capacity for reflective self-evaluation, through which
we create the identity that characterizes us, that we are the kind of agents that are free,
autonomous and moral. But it is worth wondering whether we are ever truly characterized
by that identity at which we arrive through the process of reflective endorsement. Whether
this identity, which Frankfurt and Korsgaard would have us believe characterizes our selves,

is ever an accurate description of the kind of agents that we are. I believe the question
regarding the true character of our agency remains open, but under the constraint-
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conforming approach to agency, the question becomes an empirical one. So let’s turn to
the evidence so that we may consider whether we can ever be the kind of agents that, upon
reflection, we would like to be. Let’s explore whether human beings generally behave in a

way that is consistent with the idea that we are characteristically self-conscious beings
The Pre-Conscious Aspect of Our Agency
The difference between the instrument called philosopher and the instrument called
clavichord [is that] the philosopher-instrument is sensitive, being at one and the same time player

and instrument.
							

-Denis Diderot19

I choose the term ‘pre-conscious’ not only to avoid the Freudian baggage associated
with concepts like the ‘unconscious’, but also because I think it is more appropriate given

the structure of our mind—but we will get to that later. In any case, I think it is best
to approach this subject from the angle pre-conscious agency in general. I will therefore
begin by considering the degree of sophistication of which an agent that is not conscious is
capable of. By conscious, I mean of being capable of reflexive self-evaluation, and therefore
self-aware in the sense of being aware of its own deliberation. I find that McGeer and Pettit’s

distinction between routinized and self-regulating minds is a good point of departure:
A routinized mind, be it animal or robot, will produce actions in an intentional or voluntary
way…But the system will not act intentionally with regard to how far it conforms to
evidence-related and action-related constraints as such; it will not even have beliefs as to
what those constraints are or require. Its conformity with the constraints will happen by
courtesy of nature or nurture; it will not be intentionally achieved or intentionally reinforced.

In contrast, a self-regulating mind is one that can discriminate and attend its own
intentional states as such; it is explicitly aware of the content of its intentional states, and
19.
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therefore is in a position to evaluate them and to act with the intention of altering them.
That this is simply a more formal account of the same claims we have been examining all
along becomes evident when we recall Korsgaard’s claim that,
A lower animal’s attention is fixed on the world. Its perceptions are its beliefs and its desires are
its will. It is engaged in conscious activities, but it is not conscious of them. That is, they are not
the objects of its attention. But we human animals turn our attention on to our perceptions
and desires themselves, on to our own mental activities and we are conscious of them.

So given a system with relatively simple cognitive faculties, it will be able to adjust to
incoming information in a relatively faithful manner, thereby generating a representation

that allows it to behave in an adaptive manner in relation to the constraints it faces. The
point is that all of this is possible without the system being reflexively aware of its own
intentional states in general. It need not be aware of its own representations or beliefs; it
need not be able to act intentionally with regard to how it conforms to those constraints;
it does not even need to represent what those constraints require. As long as the system
is endowed with cognitive faculties that allow for sufficiently faithful representations, the
agent will be able to act in response to them and behave adaptively. But its behavior will be

automatic and unreflective; it will be a routinized agent.
This description seems to fit the mind of relatively simple animals. Honeybees (Apis
mellifera) for example, will invariably follow a vector derived from simple dead-reckoning
that would have taken them from their hive to a feeding station, even if they are captured

as they leave the hive and are displaced to a different location.20 Their behavior is governed
by a routinized mind that unreflectively conforms to the beliefs it has about the constraints
20.
Menzel, R., Greggers, U., Smith, A., Berger, S., Brandt, R., Brunke, S., et al.. “Honey bees navigate according
to a map-like spatial memory.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 102 (2005), 3040-3045.; De Marco,
R.J. & Menzel, R.. “Learning and memory in communication and navigation in insects.” In: Learning Theory and Behavior Vol. 1 of Learning and Memory: A Comprehensive Reference, 4 vols. (J. Byrne Ed.). Oxford: Elsevier; (2008) p 477-98.
; Menzel, R., Greggers, U., Smith, A., Berger, S., Brandt, R., Brunke, S., et al.. “Honey bees navigate according to a
map-like spatial memory.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 102 (2005), 3040-3045.; Menzel, R., De
Marco R. & Greggers, U. “Spatial memory, navigation and dance behaviour in Apis mellifera.” In: Journal of Comparative Physiology A 192 (2006), 889-903.
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it faces. It is so routinized that the bees do not even respond to counterfactual evidence
about the fidelity of those representations available to them as they travel along the false
vector. Interestingly enough, however, once the bees have travelled the length of the false

vector, they reorient themselves and return to the hive (or the feeder) along a straight
homing-vector which they had probably never travelled before, suggesting that they also
have a Euclidian map-like representation available to them which they only deploy after
their initial route memory proves erroneous.21 These findings show a clear case of an
animal that automatically represents its spatial location in the environment in two different

ways, and deploys them hierarchically when navigating. This strongly suggests that these
navigating systems are supported by largely independent cognitive processes; or rather, by
one independent cognitive process which only allows the animal to navigate according to
dead reckoning, and a second which generates a richer, map-like representation that allows
the animal to be more flexible in its behavior. The system that allows for the dead-reckoning
causes the agent to follow a rigid, memorized vector—the other allows the agent to navigate
according to a Euclidian map-like representation, which requires robust interaction between

landmark, map-like based information and dead reckoning information, thus generating
a richer representation. This suggests that the bee’s mind is fragmented into at least two
modules, one of which builds on the other, but each of which is a separate source of a
different kind of agency. I will return to this important point later.
For now it is enough that we realize the degree of sophistication that is exhibited
by the bee when it navigates according to its map-like representation. Certainly nobody
would claim that honeybees are conscious in the way we are, and the rigidity of the way in
which they deploy the two navigating systems hierarchically certainly suggests that there is
very little reflexive self-evaluation going on. Yet their routinized minds allow these animals

to be able to learn the relative locations of different landmarks in their environment, and
to compute new trajectories which they have probably never travelled before. As such,
these animals do not need to be able to discriminate and attend to the contents of their
21.
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intentional states; they do not need to be capable of intentionally altering the kind of
agency they exert. The quality of their agency is given to them by their routinized minds;
what kinds of stimuli are identified as relevant constraints on their agency is determined
by which cognitive process—either the dead-reckoning system or the map-like system—is
dictating their behavior in any given context. And this is not the most striking example of
behavior supported by what seem to be completely routnized processes. Instead, ethologists

believe most animal behavior can, and should, be explained in exactly these terms. This
includes everything from altruistic behavior in birds22 and teaching in wild meerkats,23 to
inferences of social rank in fish.24 All of this behavior can be accounted for by routnized,
irreflexive cognitive processes that are sensitive to very specific stimuli and the constraints

they embody.
This is not a very controversial claim, and it is probably unsurprising to most of
us; indeed, what people commonly mean by ‘instinct’ would probably comes down to
something very similar. But most people would probably be much more reluctant to accept

that anything but the crudest of our own behavior is governed by similarly routinized
processes. Even though Freud’s idea of the subconscious, or something similar enough,
has become thoroughly entrenched in popular culture, it is usually understood in terms
of repressed urges and impulses that mysteriously affect the outcome of our deliberative
process, or as if it secretly inclined us towards certain idiosyncratic behavior that is
nevertheless ultimately made effective through the conscious exercise of our agency. In
other words, the common view is that this subconscious part of the mind secretly influences
conscious decision-making; few would be willing to acknowledge that they actually do not

have conscious control over much of their own behavior; that their ‘subconscious’ is an
independent source of very sophisticated agency.
But be that as it may, I think the latter view is much closer to the truth than the
22.
Komdeur, J. & Edelaar, P. “Male Seychelles warblers use territory budding to maximize lifetime fitness in a
saturated environment.” In: Behavioral Ecology 12 (2002), 706-715.
23.
Thornton, A. & McAuliffe, K. 2006. “Teaching in wild meerkats.” In: Science 313, 227-229.
24.
Grosenick, L., Clement, T.S. & Fernald, R.D. “Fish can infer social rank by observation alone.” In: Nature
445 (2007), 429-413.
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alternative. We make many decisions without being aware that we made them, and much
of our behavior is dictated by pre-conscious, routinized cognitive processes. No one would
claim that she consciously controls all of the operations of her own brain: nobody in their
right mind would claim that she deliberately makes her heart beat, or that she is conscious

of the process by which the waves of electromagnetic radiation that hit her retina are
converted into visual images. We all know we have no conscious control over certain ‘kneejerk’ behaviors (like the reflex which gives rise to that expression), which by itself establishes
that we do not control all the operations of the mind that dictate our behavior. But these

examples of non-conscious activity are different from the activities that concern us here.
They are instrumental and necessary, but they are not the kind of actions which interest us
in this discussion: they do not require a cognitive or associative ‘mind’ of any sort, they do
not require intentional states, and they are not goal-directed or purposeful in the relevant

sense. So let’s go to an example of relevant, agential behavior, like our daily commute to
work: we most probably do not deliberate consciously about the route that we will follow;
instead, we simply put one foot in front of the other and we arrive at our destinations even
though we might have been concentrating on a deeply engrossing phone conversation the

whole way. Nonetheless, the skeptics will grant that we do this unreflectively; but they
will reply that this is a bad example of truly pre-conscious agency. They will argue that we
learned the route to work after we had travelled it conscientiously many times. It becomes a
habit that we no longer have to think about, but it is nothing like reflex, or instinct, or any

other exercise of agency that is independent from our conscious faculties.
But the skeptic’s reply assumes that there is a fundamental difference between habit
and instinct. I believe that this (usually mistaken and unwarranted) assumption is the result

of the vagueness with which both concepts are used in common language. When asked
about the distinction between the two, the most common answers appeal to things like
‘innate as opposed to learned behavior’, or ‘natural as opposed to acquired inclinations’,
but none of this is really helpful. It is a fact that animals learn much of their ‘instinctual’
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behavior during their ontogeny, and it seems that our inclination to navigate through our
environment is just as natural as that of a bee. And if we are not willing to grant that bees
learn their map-like representations through conscious deliberation, it seems odd to assume
that we necessarily do. Instead, I believe that we become sensitive to the stimuli which are
relevant constraints on our agency in a given environment, learn how they relate with other

stimuli, and adjust our behavior on the basis of these new representations—without any
conscious mediation of the process.
This theory of pre-conscious learning which allows an agent to quickly and faithfully

adapt to those constraints that are particular to its environment is neither new, nor very
controversial in either ethology or social theory. It is also not restricted to relatively simple

behavior like navigation; it has been used to account for very sophisticated exercises of
agency, like very subtle and complex social interactions in human beings.
There is ample empirical evidence which suggests that we do not have conscious access

to the cognitive processes which support much of our agency and which dictate much
of our behavior;, nor does conscious deliberation suffice for autonomous, self-regulating
agency. John C. Marshall and Peter W. Halligan report that “in a variety of neurological
syndromes, patients may show tacit awareness of stimuli that cannot be consciously
recollected or identified.”25 In an experiment, they presented P.S., a patient who manifested
left visuo-spatial neglect, simultaneously with two line drawings of a house that were almost
the same, except that the left side of one of them was on fire. Across eleven trials, P.S. was

asked if she could identify any difference between drawings, and which house she would
prefer to live in. She reported that both drawings were identical and that she thought the
second question was silly (“because they’re the same”); yet quite remarkably, when she was
forced to choose, she preferred the house that was not burning on 9 out of 11 trials. Similar
results have been obtained in patients with other neurological syndromes like ‘blindsight’,26
25.
Marshall, J.C. & Halligan, P.W.. “Blindsight and insight into visuo-spatial neglect.” In: Nature, 366 (1998),
766-767.
26.
See Marshall paper for reference
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prosopagnosia,27 and brain tumors, where subjects correctly answered questions about the
similarities between two stimuli, despite reporting only being able to see one of them (and

like P.S., the patients found the tasks “silly” since they were being asked to compare two
stimuli when they could only detect one!).28
This gives important support to the notion that pre-conscious cognitive mechanisms

might be the source of much of human agency; our ability to make elaborate, decisions
in the abstract need not be attributed exclusively to consciousness. We have good reason
to believe that our cognitive structure might be similar in some sense to that of the bees I

discussed earlier, whose behavior was dictated by two different, independent processes. I
said that the bee’s mind was composed of at least two independent cognitive processes, each
of which supported a different kind of agency. The one caused the bee to exert a very rigid

agency; it caused the bee to invariably travel along a vector that it memorized or learned
from a conspecific. The latter allowed the bee much more sophisticated and flexible agency;

it allowed the bee to locate itself on a Euclidian map-like representation, and calculate a
new trajectory to its desired destination. Of course, human agency is probably never this
invariant or dichotomized; our mind is much more self-regulating, which allows us to engage

in nuanced behavior that shows we are sensitive to subtle variations in our environment.
As McGeer and Pettit point out, language, which requires consciousness, allows for
this kind of self-regulation. Just as consciousness allows for Korsgaard’s normative selfregulation, language allows for more general self-regulation with regard to non-normative

constraints, including those imposed by our non-moral intentional states. But recent
evidence obtained from studies on rhesus monkeys (Maccaca mulatta) suggests that preconscious psychological mechanisms are also highly self-regulating in this sense. The
monkeys exhibit behavior which cannot be accounted for unless one grants that their minds

meet the three conditions for self-regulation which McGeer and Pettit laid down: being
capable of (1) attending to the content of one’s intentional states, (2) identifying constraints
27.
28.
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on the formation of coherent and adequate intentional states, and (3) implementation of
those constraints in the process of forming intentional states. For example, rhesus monkeys

appear to be able to link knowing and behaving, at least with respect to themselves. They
engage in behavior directed at changing the state of their own knowledge—thus meeting
conditions (2) & (3)—which implies that they somehow realize that the knowledge that
they have about their environment might be inadequate to perform a task—thus meeting
conditions (1) & (2). This was demonstrated through an experiment where monkeys had
to correctly select the tube that contained a reward out of a total of four possible tubes. The
design only permitted the subject one choice per trial, which gave the monkeys an incentive
to choose a tube only if they knew it contained the reward. In the experimental conditions,

a monkey had either seen or had not seen the tube being bated with a reward (seen vs.
unseen), but in both conditions the monkey could learn where the reward was by looking
down the tubes. All of the monkeys looked down the tubes on some of both the seen and

the unseen trials, but they looked significantly more often in the unseen trials.29
Rhesus monkeys are also capable of making judgments about their own intentional
states, which, according to McGeer and Pettit, is a hallmark of a self-regulating mind.30 Son
and Kornell demonstrated this by training two rhesus monkeys to perform two cognitive
tasks: the first involved selecting the image of the longest line out of nine possibilities, all of
which were displayed simultaneously in a touch-sensitive monitor (each trial could be made
easier or harder by manipulating how similar in length the alternatives were to the correct
answer); the second was identical except that they had to choose the image which contained
the largest/smallest numerical quantity of dots. After the monkeys had made their choice,
they were allowed to place a bet on the likelihood that they had chosen correctly (they could
choose either a high-risk or low-risk bet). The results showed that they were significantly

more likely to place high-risk bets on trials where they had effectively given the correct
answer, and more likely to place a low-risk bet on trials in which their choice had been
29.
Hampton, R.R., Zivin, A., & Murray, E.A. “Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) discriminate between knowing and not knowing and collect information as needed before acting.” In: Animal Cognition 7 (2004), 239-246.
30.
McGeer & Pettit, “The Self Regulating Mind.”
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mistaken.31 Thus, in line with McGeer and Pettit’s arguments, the mind that makes these
confidence judgments must be self-regulating in all the ways they claim language allows the

human mind to be self-regulating.
So once again, either we grant that rhesus macaques are conscious in the same way we
are, or we grant that this kind of consciousness is not necessary for very sophisticated, selfregulating agency. The problem with embracing the latter view is that it blurs the distinction

between a routinized and a self-regulating mind—it seems to allow for highly complex
aspects of the mind which allow the expression of a very sophisticated and self-regulating
agency that functions without conscious mediation. It seems like it would be appropriate to
speak of pre-conscious, self-regulating parts of the mind which are nevertheless irreflexive—
or at least not sufficiently reflexive that they generate the self-consciousness which is allegedly

so characteristic of human beings.
Therefore, conscious deliberation is not the only source of sophisticated agency in
our minds. The next natural question, which takes us back to our discussion regarding the

traditional view of the soul, asks about the nature of the relationship between these preconscious sources of agency and that which results from conscious deliberation. In particular,

we need to address the puzzling fact that it certainly feel as if much, if not most, of our
behavior were governed by the reflexive, self-conscious parts of our minds. I think Daniel
Wegner’s analysis of this phenomenon is correct: he claims that we so often experience our

actions as the result of conscious deliberation that we assume that this is always the case.32
And I agree with his insistence that this impression isn’t therefore necessarily accurate—
there is overwhelming evidence (such Marshall’s work with P.S.) that it is in fact grossly
inaccurate much of the time. Michael Gazzaniga’s work on patients with a ‘split brain’ is

especially convincing.
In one experiment, he flashed an image of a chicken claw to the left hemisphere of a
31.
Son, L.K. & N. Kornell. 2005. “Metaconfidence judgments in rhesus macaques: Explicit versus implicit
mechanisms.” In: The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of the Self-Reflective Consciousness (H.S. Terrace & J. Metcalf,
Eds.), pp. 296-320. Oxford University Press, New York.
32.
Wegner, D. M. (2003). The mind’s best trick: How we experience conscious will. In: Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Vol 7(2), 65-69.
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patient’s brain (right eye), and one of a snow scene to the right hemisphere (left eye). He
then asked the patient to choose from an array of pictures arranged such that some were
lateralized to the right, and some were lateralized to the left. The patient responded by
choosing a picture of a chicken with his right hand, and a shovel with his left. When asked

why he chose those images, he answered “Oh, that’s simple, the chicken claw goes with
the chicken, and you need a shovel to clean out the chicken shed.”33 Now, we know the
left hemisphere is endowed with what Gazzaniga calls an ‘interpreter system’ that operates
on the activities of other cognitive processes, and is devoted to giving explanations. In this

case, the obvious associations were the chicken for the chicken claw, and the shovel for
the snow scene. However, since the left hemisphere did not have access to the workings of

the right hemisphere (which is a consequence of having a split brain—hence the name),
it confabulated a reasonable—but false—causal story. This experiment shows that the
behavior of the left hand is clearly governed by a cognitive process which can respond to
verbal instructions and dictate behavior on the basis of abstract representations, but none of
this is accessible to conscious reflection. Gazzaniga argues that the cognitive process in the
left hemisphere, which takes the operations of other cognitive processes as the set of data on
which it performs its own operations, generated an explanation for the left hand’s behavior

that cohered with the information it had available regarding the right hand’s behavior.
We, however, know that this information was incomplete, and thus only allowed for an
inaccurate (if coherent) account of the actual process by which the right hemisphere chose

the shovel.
But we needn’t restrict ourselves to evidence obtain from patients with abnormal
brain functioning due to injury, or surgery, etc. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) reviewed a
large amount of psychological studies in which normal subjects were asked to report on
their behavior, which had been influenced by experimental manipulations without their
knowledge. Examples included things like misattribution of emotional states to placebos
and vice-versa, erroneous beliefs regarding the effect of reassurance on willingness to take
33.

Gazaniga, M. The Mind’s Past. Berkley: University of California Press, 1998.
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electrical shocks,34 and global evaluations of an individual affecting the evaluations of
particular attributes like mannerisms or accent.35 In one particularly telling experiment,
subjects were presented with four identical stockings simultaneously, and asked to say
which particular article of clothing was of the best quality. There was a pronounced left-toright position effect, such that the right-most stocking was heavily over-chosen (by a factor
of almost four to one). However, when subjects were asked why they had chosen the article
they had, no subject mentioned the position of the article. And, when asked directly about
the possibility of this effect, virtually all subjects denied it, “usually with a worried glance at
the interviewer suggesting that they felt either that they had misunderstood the question or

were dealing with a mad-man.”36 They therefore concluded that:
Ssubjects are sometimes (a) unaware of the existence of a stimulus that importantly
influenced a response, (b) unwarare of the existence of the response, and (c) unaware that
the stimulus has affected the response…[thus], when people attempt to report on the
effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do so on the basis of any true introspection.
Instead, their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments about
the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response. 37

They argue that “people have little awareness of the nature or even the existence of
the cognitive processes that mediate judgments, inferences, and the production of complex

social behavior.”38
These conclusions are given further support by Uri Simonsohn and George
Lowenstein’s work regarding people’s housing preferences. Their results strongly suggest
that upon moving to a new city, people’s price preference and commuting tolerance are
strongly affected by what rent they were used to paying in the city they left, and how long
34.
Nisbett, R., & Wilson, T. “Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.” In: Psychological Review, 84 (1977), 231-259.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. “The halo effect: Evidence for unconscious alteration of judgments.” In:
35.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, in press.
36.
Nisbett & Wilson, “Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.”
37.
Nisbett & Wilson, “Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.”
38.
Nisbett & Wilson, “The halo effect: Evidence for unconscious alteration of judgments.”
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their commute used to be, instead of being determined by a rational deliberation regarding

their ‘true’ preferences.39 For example, upon moving to a new city, households coming
from more expensive cities reliably chose more expensive apartments in the new city than

did households coming from less expensive cities—even after controlling for potential
income effects. Similarly, individuals who were used to longer commutes in their old city

chose longer commutes in the new city when compared to individuals who were used to
shorter commutes in their old city. In addition, they observed that people who moved again

within the new city revised both their commute length and their housing expenditures,
thus countering the initial impact of previous prices and commutes. These additional
observations give further support to notion that their initial choices did not reflect their
‘true’ preferences, but that subjects were simply drawing on salient cues which in some cases

might not have been “normatively defensible.”40
Notice that these subjects had presumably not suffered brain injury of any kind, and
were not in a contrived, ecologically questionable laboratory setting. The observations were
taken from normal individuals making important, real-life decisions. It is even reasonable
to assume that these individuals all engaged in some kind of conscious deliberation during
the process of choosing a living location, and yet the most reliable predictor of both price
of rent and length commute location was how much they had paid and how long they had

commuted previously. This strongly suggests that we do not always make our decisions,
even important decisions, through conscious deliberation. Our conscious cognitive process
is not always the source of our agency—many times it is completely ignorant of the forces

that influence our decisions. It simply confabulates on these occasions.
So are we never consciously in charge? Are instances of seemingly conscious decision-

making simply post hoc rationalizations or tale-spinning? I do not think any of the evidence
39
. Simonsohn, U. “New Yorkers Commute More Everywhere: contrast effects in the field.” In: The Review of
Economics and Statistics 58 (2006), 1.
40.
Simonsohn, U. & Loewenstein, G. “Mistake # 37: The effects of previously encountered prices on current
housing demand.” In: The Economic Journal 116 (2006), 175-199.
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gives support to these assumptions either; they simply disprove the other extreme. They
simply show that consciousness is not necessary, and is not always sufficient, for selfregulation or self- determination. So the question regarding what or who actually dictates our
behavior—regarding what determines the kind of agency we exercise—therefore remains
obscure; the obvious answer, ‘cognition’, is as unhelpful and vague as the question itself.
But why is the question so vague? Why are we unable to ask something more concrete—
something that can be answered without resorting to waves of our hand and vague concepts
(like “the subconscious”) or to trivial tautologies (like “cognition”)? I believe that what is
missing is clarity regarding the whole concept of agency, its sources, and its exercise. I will
therefore proceed to answer a question that is generally not considered by philosophers
writing on human agency; viz., what is the structure of the source our agency—what is the
structure of our soul?
The Structure of our Cognitive Architecture
And if we must say that this element possesses reason, then the element with reason will also
have two parts, one, in the strict sense, possessing it in itself the other ready to listen to reason as
one is ready to listen to the reason of one’s father.
							

-Aristotle41

Let’s review where we are. Frankfurt and Korsgaard believe that our reflexive faculties
face us with a problem regarding our own agency that no other animal has to face: they
make it so that we cannot help but turning our attention to our own intentional states.
As such, we become aware that we have intentional states which we would prefer not to
have, we find that we do not always identify with many of our motives, desires, appetites,
inclinations, etc., and this puts us in a position where we can decide which of these we
would have be effective in moving us to action, and which ones we would not. They argue
that through this process of reflexive self-evaluation, we construct a self that is identified by
41.
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those desires which we treat as reason-giving, and this autonomous process of identifying

with some of our desires gives rise to an agential identity that commits us to exercising
our agency according to those reasons. As such, we create a self with a practical identity
through this process of reflexive endorsement, which should be understood as the source of
our freedom, and of the normative constraints which we autonomously choose to impose

on ourselves. If they are correct, it has to be appropriate to say that human beings are
the kinds of beings whose agency is limited by autonomously self-imposed constraints.
However, there is much empirical evidence that suggests this is not the case. It seems like

we many times respond to constraints without being consciously aware that they exist
(Marshall’s work with P.S.; Nisbett and Wilson’s experiment with the stockings, etc.); that
upon reflection, we give incorrect reports regarding which constraints determined how we

behaved (Gazzaniga’s work with ‘split brain’ patients); and that we even make important
decisions that probably involved a good deal of conscious deliberation on the basis of simple
biases which we probably would not endorse as being the relevant constraints for that kind
of a decisions (Simonsohn and Loewenstein’s studies on rent and commuting preferences).

What this means is that many times, the internal principles of action which dictate
our behavior are not accessible for reflective evaluation. It is not simply the case that we
might not have conscious control over which of our motives and desires are effective—many
of the forces that govern our behavior might not even be available for reflective evaluation.
The problem with how we relate to our own agency turns out to be more complicated than
the already puzzling reality that we often encounter desires that seem completely alien and
contrary to our self-conception—we must add to this picture the fact that we many times

do not encounter desires, motives, appetites, passions, inclinations, dispositions, preferences,
etc., that we would presumably then have to decide whether to endorse or reject. However,
much of the difficulty is not actually inherent in the problem itself. Instead, it results from
how philosophers traditionally approach the problem. I believe that many of the difficulties

result from the prevalence of traditional views regarding the sources of human agency.
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According to these views, which can be traced back to Aristotle’s dichotomized view of the
soul (as presented in the quote at the beginning of this sub-section), reason and appetite are
conceptually independent faculties whose only relationship to each other lies in the fact that

reason should govern the appetites.
I do not think it is too controversial to maintain that the human soul, understood as
the fundamental source of our capacity for intentional, goal directed activity, is embodied

in our cognitive faculties. In any case, it is my view that cognition is the source of agency.
Agency—the capacity to act in an intentional, goal-directed manner—at the very least
requires the capacity to represent the goals in pursuit of which agency is exercised, and the
environment in which those goals are pursued. The process by which these representations
are generated is called cognition. If we understand the structure of our cognitive architecture,
we will be in a position to assess what can be true of human agency and the degree to which

any given characterization of our agency is plausible in light of the properties of those
faculties which support our agency altogether.
I will use Cheney and Seyfarth’s definition of cognition: it is the ability to relate different

unconnected pieces of information in new ways and to apply the resulting knowledge in
an adaptive manner (How Monkeys See the World, 1990). Let me build on what it means
to “relate” different unconnected pieces of information. A cognitive process could be said

to identify the particular way in which particular types of stimuli relate to each other.
Formally, cognition could be said to generate an abstract data type (ADT)—cognition
could be said to be a process of identifying relationships or links (edges) between elements
of the set of relevant stimuli (the set of potential vertices). In other words, cognition could
be defined as a set of faculties which construct graphs to represent the relationships between

the stimuli which are relevant to the organism. A graph is an abstract representation of a
set of objects (vertices) where some pairs of the objects are connected by links (edges). A
detailed description of a particular cognitive process should include the exact properties of

the ADT—the properties of the links between the vertices, and the types of stimuli that
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can be taken as vertices.42
The resulting mind can best be understood as the aggregate of multiple, highly
interconnected—but fundamentally independent—cognitive processes, each of which is
exclusively dedicated to constructing the graph which relates the elements of very specific

sets of stimuli to each other. The result is a network of multiple, specialized cognitive
processes, each of which is responsible for generating and responding to a particular part of
the representation which determines how we exercise our agency. Some units, for example,
might be devoted to processing different parts of the information collected by our sensorial
apparatus, some others might be devoted to processing information about our own body,

and some might be devoted to processing the information presented by certain other
cognitive processes. These latter cognitive processes could be viewed as being responsible for
evaluating and integrating the representations of those units on which they perform their
operations, thereby providing a richer, more nuanced intentional representation. But there is
no reason to assume that all the units will be fully integrated with each other at any level. As
such, it is possible that some units in one part of the network are more integrated with each
other than they are with units in another part of the network. If each of these less integrated
parts is sufficiently complex to generate a sophisticated, self-regulating representation, they
could each independently support the exercise of very sophisticated human agency. If these

sub-components of the network are not sufficiently interconnected with each other such
that their individual representations are not integrated with those of other sub-components,

the mind which is embodied by this network would contain multiple sources of agency
whose dictates would not necessarily coincide. Thus, any one sub-component could, as it
42.
The relationships represented in a ‘directed’ graph, for example, will specify a particular order between the
vertices. Namely, the relationship (x,y) is different from (y,x). The significance is very intuitive if taken out of the formal
sphere: (John loves Mary) is different from (Mary loves John). Moreover, the edges in a directed graph can have ‘weights’
assigned to them. The weight of a relationship could be understood as the intensity of the relationship or the probability
with which the relationship will be established (John loves Mary very much/little—or—John is very likely/unlikely to
love Mary).
I will be using ‘stimuli’ in a very general sense of the word. By stimuli I mean any information to which an
organism could be sensitive. Non-observable mental states will be understood to fall into this category. Similarly, ‘types
of stimuli’ simply refers to an arbitrary subset of the set of stimuli to which an organism is sensitive: visual stimuli, conspecifics, behavior, etc., could all be different types of stimuli.
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were, temporarily commandeer control of the entire agent’s behavior. This leaves us with a

fragmented agent—one whose agency is the product of several, disjoined sources who do
not necessarily find the same stimuli to be relevant, and who perhaps would direct behavior

towards conflicting (perhaps even mutually exclusive) goals.
It must be admitted that this account of human cognition is not entirely uncontroversial,

but the traditional views are no more robust. Though the connectionist assumptions on
which it relies are not universally accepted,43 the debate seems to be leaning in favor of a
model that is consistent with those assumptions given that they align very nicely with the

neurological architecture of the brain, and that they allow for a theory of cognition that
is more plausible than the classical alternatives.44 The resulting model further provides us
with a view of the mind that can be reconciled with the body of odd behavioral evidence
that I have presented, which can be made sense of if we allow that the source of our agency

is less than unified.
Though it might still seem like one could superimpose this picture of our cognitive
architecture onto the Aristotelian map of the soul such that the appetites are generated by

one set of cognitive processes, and reason is embodied by another set cognitive process,
I believe this would be a stubborn attempt to adhere to a fundamentally misconstrued
understanding of the relationship between reason and all the other potential principles of
action. As I suggested earlier, reflexivity can, and must, be built into this cognitive structure

to allow for the self-regulation that is required by an intentional system that is capable of
deliberately acting on its own intentional states. Now, as Frankfurt points out, it is not
entirely clear what order of reflexivity must be attained for consciousness to arise,45 but
43.
Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. “Connectionism and cognitive architecture: a critical analysis.” In: Cognition, 28
(1988), 3-71.
44.
Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. “Cognitive systems as dynamical systems.” Topoi. 11 (1992), 27-43.; Smolensky,
P. “On the proper treatment of connectionism.” In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 11 (1988), 1-74.; van Gelder, T. J.
“Compositionality: a connectionist variation on a classical theme.” In: Cognitive Science, 14 (1990), 355-384.
45.
However, it is not clear to me that this reflexivity which allows a system to be self-regulating with respect to
its own intentional states by itself can account for the qualia of human consciousness. Whatever the case, I think it is
safe to say that reflexivity allows for self-awareness. I am therefore inclined to agree with Frankfurt when he says that selfconsciousness involves immanent reflexivity, at least if one restricts the meaning of the term self-consciousness to being
coextensive with self-awareness. I will use these two, as well as consciousness and awareness more generally, interchangeably, and ignore the question of qualia.
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consciousness necessarily involves “a secondary awareness of a primary response.”46 If the
primary response is conceived simply as a lower-order cognitive process, consciousness
involves a secondary awareness of the operations of a more primary cognitive process which

performs its operations independently of the conscious evaluation.
The Construction of a Self Out of a Fragment of Our Agency
“I have done that,” says my memory. “I could not have done that,” says my pride, and
remains inexorable. Eventually—memory yields.
							

-Nietzsche47

Frankfurt’s theory is more in line with my account of the structure of those faculties

which support our capacity for agency than most traditional views of the human soul,
in so far as it recognizes that the characterizing essence of human agency lies more in the
structure of our will than in our capacity to reason. But the manner in which he arranged the
hierarchy between the different parts of this structure still falls prey to the traditional fallacy

where conscious reasoning is assigned an erroneously independent and unwarrantedly
authoritative position. But if it is in fact the case that consciousness arises as a result of the
reflexive integration of the operations of more primary cognitive processes, then there is an
important sense in which conscious reasoning is inseparable from, and dependent on, the
internal principles of action which these primary processes embody. More simply, it would
be the case that conscious deliberation only operates with reference to the representations

and the determinations of the lower-order cognitive processes. As such, variations in the
salience or vehemence of the determinations of one cognitive process would intrinsically
affect the determinations at which a conscious deliberative process can arrive.
I think a short digression will make this claim somewhat clearer: Philosophers
consistently exhibit a peculiar bias in favor of those conclusions at which we arrive during
46.
47.
1989.

Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.”
Nietzsche, F. “Beyond good and evil : prelude to a philosophy of the future.” New York : Vintage Books,
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‘cool moments of deliberation,’ over those at which we arrive in the ‘heat of the moment.’

The most common justification appeals to the lack of time that is characteristic of these
‘hot’ moments, which implies that the conclusions of the deliberative process would have

resulted in different behavior had the agent been allowed more time to reason. Another
line of defense makes an appeal to the fact that normal deliberation can be influenced by
abnormal affective states. The argument here is that the deliberative process is influenced
by excessive emotional responses, or that the abnormal affective reactions to the ‘heat of the
moment’ alter the normal course of reasoning. But this also begs the question as to why the
affective states characteristic of ‘cool’ moments should be the standard for normal deliberative
process. Being ‘cool’ is as much an affective state as any other, and the philosophers have not

provided a reason to assume that correct deliberation only occurs under the influence of
those emotions and not any others. It certainly does not seem obvious to me that in the ‘heat
of the moment,’ it is not better to have one’s deliberation influenced by the affective states

normal to those situations rather than those normal to ‘cool moments.’ Stress, arousal, anger,
fear, infatuation, apathy, tranquility, satisfaction, etc., are all affective states that influence
the way in which we deliberate—and we are probably rather content with that reality. It is
surely not the case that we would prefer never to have our decision-making influenced by

less than rational forces.
But the point is that our preferences are actually irrelevant on this matter. If
conscious deliberation intrinsically only functions with reference to the operations of
the lower-order cognitive processes, then the determinations at which we can arrive
through conscious deliberation will intrinsically be influenced by the relative salience of
the particular determinations of those lower-order processes upon which it operates. As
McGeer and Pettit point out, any capacity for the self-regulation of a system’s intentional

states is limited by virtue of the fact that one intentional state can only be evaluated with
reference to another intentional state whose soundness is, at that instance of evaluation,
taken for granted.48 So the consistency of the outcome of our conscious deliberation will
48.
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irrevocably be threatened on two fronts. One the one side, it is possible that variations
in the salience of the determinations of different lower-order cognitive processes cause
variations in the relative weights assigned to them during conscious deliberation. On the
other, the dictates of our conscious deliberation will depend on what cognitive process
provides the intentional state which we take as the standard against which we evaluate the

other intentional states when we engage in reflexive self-evaluation.
That is why Frankfurt’s example of the unwilling drug addict is not very helpful; it
presents us with an impossibly impoverished depiction of the psychology of an agent who is
reflecting on his desires in a single context. If we imagine that same individual in a different

context, perhaps in one where he normally does drugs, it is not implausible to assume
perhaps he would fully endorse his desire to take the drug—indeed these kinds of dramatic

reversals are not at all uncommon amongst chronic heroin users, to name one example,49
or amongst people who have become sexually aroused. Ariel and Loewenstein showed
that peoples’ judgments, preferences, and their reports on how they would behave, are all

dramatically affected by the state of their sexual arousal—even though their knowledge
was not influenced.50 For example, in both across-subject and within-subject comparisons,
subjects at higher levels of sexual arousal, were much more likely to report being willing to

have unsafe sex with a hypothetical partner than were subjects assigned to at lower levels
of arousal, even though subjects in both groups were equally likely to report they knew the
inherent risk of contracting a sexually transmitted disease from that partner. So, Frankfurt’s
account would commit us to making the odd concession that we would be dealing with a
different person at different times; stranger still, in the case of the drug addicts, we would
have to recognize that it is possible that these agents are at times free and at times not free

by virtue of acting on the same desire.
I think enough evidence of the significant problems with Frankfurt’s theory has
been provided. Though compelling, there is simply no evidence that suggests that we have
49.
Bourgois, P. & Schonberg, J. Righteous Dopefiend. Los Angeles: California Series in Anthropology, 2009.
50.
Ariel & Loewenstein. “The Heat of The Moment: The Effect of Sexual Arousal on Sexual Decision Making.”
In: The Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19 (2006), 87-98.
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conscious access to many of the forces that determine how we behave such that we may
carry out a comprehensive, reflexive self-evaluation that results in a view of the character of
our agency that is accurate inter-temporally —or even at any given instant. Instead, I agree

with David Velleman that this process of alleged self-definition is perhaps more a case of
wishful thinking that results in self-deception.51 I believe that what results from this process
of reflective endorsement is not our true ‘self’, but rather a hopeful self-conception that is

not representative the actual character of our agency.
The problem is that Frankfurt’s view, all desires, impulses, motives, inclinations,
dispositions, reasons, or any other denomination for our internal principles of action,
are external to the individual and are only internalized if the agent reflectively endorses
them. But one could view it the other way as well; one could grant the prerogative to all
the unreflective processes such that all their dictates would be internal to the agent until
they were externalized by her consciousness. In other words, one could just as easily view
consciousness as a usurper of one’s identity rather than its legitimate guardian (Nietzsche,

for example, could certainly be read in this way).52
I think both positions are arbitrary and equally wrong. Philosophers sustain that
consciousness is the sources of human agency, and I do not entirely disagree—I believe it is
one of the sources of our agency. Yet I hope to have established that it is not the only source,
nor the most powerful one. I claim that it is not the most legitimate source of our agency
because it cannot take into account the dictates of all the other aspects of our agency at the

same time, nor can we be sure that it gives their determinations sufficient weight. Ariely
and Loewenstein’s experiment is a case in point: they conclude that “sexual arousal seems
to narrow the focus of motivation, creating a kind of tunnel-vision where goals other than

sexual fulfillment become eclipsed.”53 And as I argued earlier, any bias in favor of those
desires which we endorse in a ‘cool moment of deliberation’ over those which we endorse
51.
Velleman, David. “Self to Self.” In Identification and Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Nietzchse, “Beyond Good and Evil: the genealogy of morals.”
52.
53.
Ariely, D. & Loewenstein, G. “The Heat of The Moment: The Effect of Sexual Arousal on Sexual Decision
Making.”
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in ‘the heat of the moment’ is unwarranted. Thus, identification through reflexive selfevaluation will necessarily alienate us from aspects of our agency which not only will move
to action at times, but will necessarily alienate us from aspects of our agency by which we

would perhaps want to be moved to action in certain situations. But it is equally wrong to
consider our self-consciousness an illegitimate source of agency.
I believe that the correct view is to consider ourselves as fragmented or disjointed
agents—as beings endowed with multiple, highly interconnected sources of agency that
are nonetheless not fully integrated with, and significantly independent of, each other. And

although some integration results from reflexive self-evaluation, it is circumspect to what
degree it can truly allow us unify our selves; in the end, it seems like it will always fail to fully
integrate the determinations of all the sources of our agency. For this reason, one can only
treat the dictates of reason as the dictates of one of the sources of agency; perhaps a source
of agency that has unified many others, but they are nevertheless the dictates of a fragment

of our agency. As such, the agent qua agent cannot be identified with those dictates to the
exclusion of the rest.
However, this means that if we accept Frankfurt’s theory concerning freedom of
the will, we will have to acknowledge that either we rarely enjoy that kind of freedom, or
that we are a collection of many different free agents, each one of which sporadically and
unpredictably comes to govern the behavior of our bodies. Similarly, if we accept Korsgaard’s

theory of normativity, we have to acknowledge that we are thoroughly inconsistent in
abiding by our own normative commitments. It is simply the case that any conception
of ourselves at which we arrive through a process of reflexive self-evaluation will fail to be
an accurate description of the character of our agency. We do not limit the exercise of our
agency according to those constraints which we reflexively endorse—in fact, we do not even

consistently endorse the same constraints!
So are we the kinds of agents that we would consciously like to be, as Frankfurt would
like to believe? Is Korsgaard right in her claim that obligation is an inescapable reality of
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our lives? Would it be right to say that human beings are the kind of agents who live within

the limits we believe we have reason to respect? My answer is that to a certain extent, we
can be, but whether we actually are can only be decided by evaluating all the aspects of our
agency. Whether we are the kind of agents that we conceive ourselves to be is an empirical
question—it is a question cannot be settled through introspection. As things stand, we do
not yet understand the structure and functioning of the mind sufficiently well to allow us
to conclude which of its many faculties is the ultimate determinant of our behavior, if ever
such a faculty is to be discovered. It seems that we are just as ignorant regarding the causes
of our own behavior as we are regarding the causes of the universe in general. Here, David

Hume’s observations regarding the latter phenomenon seem perfectly applicable:
We must be far removed from the smallest tendency to skepticism not to be apprehensive
that we have here got quite beyond the reach of our faculties…we know not how far
we ought to trust our vulgar methods of reasoning in such a subject… Were a man to
abstract form everything which he knows or has seen, he would be altogether incapable,
merely from his own ideas, to determine what kind of scene the universe [or in our case
the mind] must be, or to give the preference to one state or situation of things above
another. For as nothing which he clearly conceives could be esteemed impossible or imply
a contradiction, every chimera of his fancy would be upon an equal footing; nor could he
assign any just reason why he adheres to one idea or system, and rejects the others which
are equally possible.54

Thus, I believe we can only settle this question about the character of our agency by
observing our behavior, since only in practice are all the different aspects of our fragmented
agencies allowed to express themselves. And if we sometimes act on desires which we wish

were not a part of who we are, then so be it. It seems to me that Diderot was entirely
right in his account of the difference between a human being and a clavichord: the sounds

a clavichord makes depend exclusively on which keys are stricken by an external entity,
whereas a philosopher can strike her own keys. But this leaves open the possibility that we
54.
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are many times not the composers of the music that we play, nor are we the interpreters.
So perhaps my grandfather’s skepticism on this matter was wiser than it seemed as I was
growing up. Perhaps we would do well to follow his advice that the path one should take
care to travel does not lead to self-discovery—but rather to self-acceptance.
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